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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the primary government balance in Central and 
Eastern European countries reacts in the short term, in order to assess fiscal sustain-
ability in the long run. For the purpose of this study, a fiscal reaction function is used. 
Given the different orders of integration of the variables involved in the model, modified 
forms of the fiscal reaction function are considered. The results show that for Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania fiscal policy reacts as expected – in 
the sense that governments have the ability to run a primary surplus – in the short term. 
This action makes fiscal sustainability easier to achieve in the long run. On the other 
hand, for Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, sustainable fiscal policy will be more 
difficult to attain given the opposite response of governments to public debt shocks. 
In these countries, severe fiscal adjustments should be made in order to reach fiscal sus-
tainability in the long run. 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal sustainability has been thoroughly studied in the literature of the last 
two decades. According to Agnello and Sousa (2009), unsustainable fiscal policy 
could harm the welfare state through large fiscal deficits and excessive public debt 
stocks, generating an  inefficient allocation of resources, an  excessive public debt 
stock that could affect future generations, and an increase in the inflation rate and its 
volatility. In addition, de Castro Fernandez and Hernandez de Cos (2000) argued that 
unsustainable fiscal policies involve a risk of future interest rate rises, leading to 
a slowdown in economic growth. Buiter (2004) also emphasized phenomena that are 
likely to happen when fiscal sustainability is not achieved: i) public spending could 
be lower and tax revenues could be higher than originally planned; ii) the inflation 
rate could be higher than expected; iii) public debt could be defaulted on. Running 
unsustainable fiscal policies could worsen the macroeconomic conditions and make 
economies more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.  
European Union (EU) fiscal sustainability is still a much debated and contro-
versial topic. Unsound fiscal policies of individual members could have adverse ef-
fects and harm other members’ economies. In that sense, Afonso (2000) showed that 
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before the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted, fiscal policy was not sus-
tainable in most European Monetary Union countries, with the possible exceptions 
of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. Recently, Afonso and Rault (2007) found 
that even if the sustainability of public finances in the EU-15 over the period 1970– 
–2006 was an issue in some countries, fiscal policy was sustainable for the EU-15 
panel set. One year later, Afonso and Rault (2008) conducted the first panel analysis 
of fiscal sustainability encompassing the enlarged set of 27 EU countries. They used 
data spanning the period 1960–2006 and reached the conclusion that fiscal policy is 
not sustainable within the EU-27 panel.  
Moreover, in the years ahead, many developed countries will have to deal with 
the challenges of population aging. There are studies that predict that the current fiscal 
policies of most EU countries based on growing social spending will become unsus-
tainable in the future (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996; Alesina, 2000; Kotlikoff and Hagist, 
2005). More recently, Balassone et al. (2009) showed that countries currently recording 
high fiscal surpluses (Finland) or those that have undertaken major structural reforms 
of their pension systems (Germany, Austria, and Italy) tend to experience lower sus-
tainability risks. However, according to the indicators calculated by these authors, most 
of the euro countries will have to adjust their fiscal policies sooner or later.  
In addition, Fatas and Mihov (2009) found that over the period 1970–2007, 
fiscal policy in the euro area was mildly pro-cyclical, and the adoption of the com-
mon currency and the constraints imposed by the SGP did not have a large impact on 
the cyclical behavior of the structural balance. According to Marin (2002), the rules 
of budgetary discipline set out in SGP, which require a balanced or surplus budget, 
preserve fiscal sustainability via automatic stabilizers. 
Empirical evidence shows that most of the  European countries
1 have been 
confronted with large fiscal imbalances and public debt stocks since 1970. The fiscal 
position for many EU countries was similar also in the early ‘90s with notable im-
provement for Belgium, Italy and Netherlands (see in that sense, Afonso, Agnello, 
Furceri and Sousa, 2009).  
There is a large stream of literature that has investigated fiscal sustainability for 
the developed European countries. But what is the situation in the newcomers, espe-
cially the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)?
2 There is a small body of 
research investigating the  issue of fiscal sustainability exclusively among emerging 
economies within the European Union (i.e., Schneider and Zapal, 2006; Aristovnik and 
Bostjan, 2007; Aristovnik, 2008). This study contributes to the existing literature by 
shedding some light on whether fiscal sustainability represents an issue for CEECs. 
CEECs are having to cope with the  constraints imposed by the  Maastricht 
Treaty on their way to becoming market economies. The statistical data show that 
they recorded annual fiscal deficits of below 3% of GDP on average between 2000 
and 2008,
3 with the exceptions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slova-
1 We refer to the members of the European Union before its enlargement to include Central and Eastern
European countries. 
2 The Central and Eastern Europe countries are Bulgaria (BG), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), 
Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SI). 
3 Annual statistical data on fiscal deficits, primary balances, public debt, real interest rates, and real growth
rates over the period 2000–2008 are available from Eurostat. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 6                                              503 
kia. There was a clear downward tendency in public debt as a ratio to GDP in Bul-
garia, Lithuania, and Romania. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Slo-
vakia, public debt rose in the period considered. The region’s average of public debt- 
-ratio-to GDP was still below 60%, with Hungary as the only outlier with debt 
reaching 70% of GDP. The primary balance recorded, on average, a deficit in most of 
the countries (only Bulgaria and Estonia had primary surpluses). Real interest rates 
were below real growth rates with no exceptions, which should guarantee debt re-
duction and thus fiscal sustainability under a reasonable moderate fiscal policy 
stance. Considering all the above, this study would like to answer the question of 
whether the  fiscal policy of the CEECs is sustainable in the long run, taking into 
account their governments’ response to public debt shocks in the short term.  
The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate the fiscal policy reaction to 
public debt shocks in the short term aimed at achieving sustainability of fiscal policy 
in the long run in the CEECs. In accordance with the purpose of this paper, we will 
use the fiscal reaction function (FRF). The paper is structured as follows. The next 
section presents the mathematical model of fiscal sustainability. Section 3 is devoted 
to describing the  investigation methodology and the  data used. It will emphasize 
the importance of using the fiscal reaction function. Empirical results are also pre-
sented in Section 3. The last section gives the concluding remarks of the study. 
2. Theoretical Background of Fiscal Sustainability 
Blanchard (1990) and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hageman, and Sartor (1990) con-
sidered that fiscal policy is sustainable when public debt does not explode and 
governments are not forced to increase taxes, decrease spending, monetize fiscal de-
ficit or repudiate public debt. In addition, they imposed the restriction that the present 
value of future primary surpluses must equal the current level of public debt. Con-
sidering this, the arithmetic of fiscal sustainability (see, for instance, Blanchard, 1990; 
Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hageman, and Sartor, 1990; Gramlich, 1990; Horne, 1991; 
and Buiter, 1995, among a long list of studies) starts with the government budgetary 
constraint: 
                            11 1 (1 ) tt t t t t t t BGRB i B GR i B − −− = −+ + ⋅ =−+ + ⋅                      (1) 
where: 
Bt = total amount of real public debt at time t; 
Gt = non-interest real government expenditure (including transfers and capital 
expenditures) at time t; 
Rt = real government revenues (including non-tax and privatization revenues) 
at time t; 
i = real interest rate for government borrowing. 
According to equation (1), the total amount of public debt (Bt) at a particular 
moment depends on the current primary deficit (Gt–Rt) and on the public debt ac-
cumulated in the past (Bt–1), including interest payments on government borrowing 
(i·Bt–1).
4  
4 There are studies (see, for instance, Buiter, 2004) that take into account the money base or seigniorage. In 
most of the countries (EU member states) seigniorage is forbidden by law. Consequently, we should not
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Taking into account expectations Et at time t in equation (1), the intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC) is represented by: 
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The intertemporal budget constraint states that the public debt stock (Bt) 
equals the discounted present value of the expected primary balance (Gt+1+k – Rt+1+k) 
plus the limit value of discounted public debt (Bt+k+1). Fiscal policy is said to be 
sustainable if the  present discounted value of public debt converges to zero, ac-
cording to the transversality condition: 
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In a growing economy with rising government spending and an increasing tax 
base, budgetary equations (1) and (2) can be expressed by taking into consideration 
the real growth rate of GDP (y) and the variables denoted by small letters as a ratio to 
GDP (bt, gt, rt). The government budgetary constraint (1) as a ratio to GDP becomes: 











                                   (4) 
where:  
bt = ratio of public debt to GDP at time t; 
gt = ratio of non-interest government expenditure (including transfers and 
capital expenditures) to GDP at time t; 
rt = ratio of government revenues (including non-tax and privatization 
revenues) to GDP at time t; 
i = real interest rate for government borrowing; 
y = real growth rate. 
 
Considering expectations at time t in equation (4), the IBC becomes: 
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Consequently, fiscal policy is sustainable if: 

















= 0                                         (6) 
A good starting point in assessing fiscal sustainability is to check for gov-
ernment solvency based on the IBC.
5 However, according to various authors, sol-
vency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability (see, for 
example, Horne, 1991). Consequently, solvency requires that the debt is fully repaid 
5 For instance, Buiter (2004) considers that analyzing fiscal sustainability relies on checking for solvency
of the state. Therefore, he states that the assessment of fiscal sustainability should be investigated by in-
cluding all contractual liabilities and assets of the state, or at least the consolidated central government 
sector and central bank. Buiter’s approach to fiscal sustainability analysis is very comprehensive and has
to handle at least the valuation of state assets such as natural resources, infrastructure, and other state 
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at some point in the future, and sustainability requires that, moreover, solvency is 
achieved under unchanged fiscal policy (see Croce and Juan-Ramon, 2003).  
The intertemporal budget constraint and the  transversality condition imply 
that fiscal policy is sustainable when governments can use primary surpluses to fi-
nance the initial public debt stock. The IBC could be relaxed in the sense of Chalk 
and Hemming (2000), who consider that sustainability requires that the present value 
of future primary surpluses must exceed the present value of future primary deficits 
by a sufficient amount to cover the initial debt stock. This relaxed assumption allows 
for occasional primary deficits, but primary surpluses should be larger. The initial 
IBC and the relaxed IBC can generate the same cost in terms of primary surpluses, 
but that cost will be differently distributed over time. 
3. Testing Fiscal Sustainability in the Case of CEECs 
3.1.Methodology  
Theoretically speaking, the IBC is a criterion that can be used by governments 
to choose from different sets of fiscal policies that prove to be sustainable in 
the  future. But the  major issue in that context is whether, given a  fiscal policy, 
governments can predict the amount of budgetary expenditure and revenue or the fu-
ture real interest rate over 20–30 years in order to readjust their policy. Moreover, in 
general, the literature assumes that, for equations (2) to (6), the real interest rate and 
the real growth rate are both positive and constant in the long run. This assumption 
is made, for instance, in Hamilton and Flavin (1986), where the authors investigate 
the fiscal sustainability of the USA. Choosing a different approach, Wilcox (1989) 
proposes variable interest rates and also allows negative discount rates. Taking this 
approach further, Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that in the case of a non-constant 
interest rate, sustainability no longer implies cointegration between the debt and 
the primary balance and also that the integration orders of the two variables can be 
different. Besides this point, they emphasize that the IBC holds as long as there are 
positive real interest rates. The IBC is influenced by the level of real interest rates, 
similarly to the case of the net present value (NPV) of an investment, where using 
too high or too low an interest rate can affect the investment decision. For instance, 
International Monetary Fund (2003) considers that the IBC is sensitive to the level of 
the interest rate and can be difficult to interpret when the rate changes with market 
conditions. Therefore, it proposes that the appropriate real interest rate should ideal-
ly capture the long-term return on risk-free assets. This can be useful when applying 
the IBC on estimated data in the long run, but on historical data, when dealing with 
a high inflation rate, it can be misleading.  
There is a large literature investigating fiscal sustainability among different 
countries. Most of the studies rely upon the seminal work of Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986), Wilcox (1989), and Trehan and Walsh (1991). Generally speaking, there are 
two classical methodological approaches: the unit root test (Hamilton and Flavin, 
1986; Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Corsetti and Roubini, 1991; Uctum and Wickens, 
2000; Afonso, 2000, 2005) and cointegration tests (Elliot and Kearney, 1988; Hakkio 
and Rush, 1991; Payne, 1997; Afonso, 2000, 2005). 
There are several studies (see, for instance, Bohn, 1998, 2005, 2007), how-
ever, that cast some doubt on the relevance of classical empirical tests. The critics 506                                              Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 6 
highlight the fact that the previous tests rely on assumptions about expected primary 
surpluses that are difficult to estimate. Therefore, Bohn demonstrated that the assess-
ment of fiscal sustainability is ensured by the fiscal reaction function that describes 
the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio as a  positive function of the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio. The fiscal reaction function represents a more flexible approach to investigat-
ing fiscal sustainability, and, unlike classical tests, it gives valuable insights into 
the magnitude and the lag of the government’s reaction to public debt shocks. More-
over, the fiscal reaction function reveals the government’s ability to generate a pri-
mary surplus in the short term in order to meet the constraints imposed by the IBC in 
the long run.  
The fiscal reaction function (FRF) can be estimated by regressing the primary 
balance on public debt values: 
                                              tt t t pb Z α βδε = +⋅+⋅ +                                   (7) 
where: 
pt = primary balance-to-GDP ratio (surplus/deficit) at time t; 
bt = public debt-to-GDP ratio at time t; 
Zt = set of explanatory variables at time t; 
α, β, δ = coefficients; 
εt = error terms (white noise). 
 
The fiscal reaction function allows for testing of the government’s response to 
changes in the public debt stock. An increasing public debt-to-GDP ratio is expected 
to generate an immediate fiscal policy reaction consisting in an improvement of the pri-
mary balance (a lower deficit or a higher surplus). The fiscal sustainability model 
presented in section 2 can be considered a forward-looking model that uses expected 
values of the primary balance and discount rates. It shows whether the government 
can generate future primary surpluses whose discounted value equals the  current 
stock of public debt, making the assumption that the transversality condition is ful-
filled (the terminal value of the public debt stock converges to zero). The fiscal re-
action function can be viewed as a backward-looking model based on historical data 
that indicates whether governments had the ability in the past to run higher surpluses, 
or at least to lower the primary deficit, when public debt increased. The FRF is a tool 
used to assess fiscal policy sustainability in the long run. If governments were able to 
generate primary surpluses in the past, and fiscal policy was flexible enough to re-
spond to increasing public debt, then future higher surpluses assessed as meeting 
the constraints imposed by the IBC in the long run will not create difficulties and 
fiscal sustainability will be easier to achieve. Conversely, if the FRF shows that the gov-
ernment reacted in the  opposite way and lowered surpluses when public debt in-
creased, then, in the future it will be difficult to meet the IBC constraints and fiscal 
sustainability will be difficult to achieve in the long run. In addition, Bohn (1998) 
argues that if the primary surplus responds positively to an increase in debt, then 
the government’s fiscal reaction function can be viewed as sustainable. Such a test 
reduces to examining whether β > 0 in equation (7). 
Many studies that analyze fiscal sustainability based on the fiscal reaction 
function rely upon Barro’s work (1979), which states that the determinants (Zt) of Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 6                                              507 
the fiscal stance are business cycles, temporary government spending, and several 
other explanatory variables. In this sense, Bohn (2005) used the squared debt-to-GDP. 
De Mello (2005) estimated equation (7) using the lagged primary balance, indebt-
edness, and inflation, while also allowing for institutional variables that took into 
account the impact of different fiscal laws. Greiner, Koeller, and Semmler (2005) 
worked with the social surplus ratio (social security budget), the long-term interest 
rate, and the  lagged debt-to-GDP ratio besides the  business cycle as explanatory 
variables for the primary balance. Kirchgaessner and Prohl (2006) added as explana-
tory variables expected inflation and temporary fluctuations in government military 
expenditure. IMF (2003) estimated the  fiscal reaction function for industrial and 
emerging countries using the primary balance as a dependent variable. This study 
represented an  extension of Bohn’s (1998) paper and showed that a  response of 
the primary balance to public debt shocks indicates “the consistency of fiscal policy 
with long-run solvency” (IMF, 2003, p.  127). Similar studies investigating fiscal 
sustainability using the fiscal reaction function were developed by Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay (2005) and Staehr (2008) for European countries, the USA, and 
Japan. 
The aim of the fiscal reaction function employed in this paper is to investigate 
how the government responds in the short run to changes in the public debt stock, in 
order to assess fiscal sustainability in the long run. Generally, the theory states that 
the response of the primary balance to higher debt stocks should be immediate, im-
plying fiscal sustainability. But there are authors who consider a delayed reaction on 
account of interest payments that occur at a later time (Greiner, Koeller, and Semm-
ler, 2005). Consequently, a delayed response of the government to public debt shocks 
does not necessarily imply unsustainable fiscal policy. However, it can be argued that 
such a  situation depends on the  frequency of the  time series used and should be 
judged accordingly. 
3.2 Data  
The fiscal reaction function (7) is estimated for all CEECs using quarterly 
data from 2000 to 2008 for the primary balance
6 and public debt as ratios to GDP. 
The data is available from Eurostat. Some descriptive statistics for the data used are 
presented in Table 1.  
The data used for estimation of the  fiscal reaction function is seasonally 
adjusted using the  difference from the  moving average. Taking into account that 
the quarterly data spans only nine years (2000–2008), it was assumed that seasonal 
factors are constant. Moreover, the additive option was applied, considering the nega-
tive values of the primary balance.  
Testing for unit roots, the  results show some interesting particularities of 
the time series. For instance, in most of the cases considered, the primary balance is 
stationary, but public debt has a different order of integration than the primary bal-
ance. The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots and the options 
used accordingly for the time series are presented in Table 2 and in Table 1A in 
the Appendix).  
6 The primary balance-to-GDP ratio is calculated on quarterly data as the difference between total general 
government revenue and primary government expenditure as ratios to GDP. Primary government expendi-
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Table 2   Order of Integration 
Country  Order of integration for 
primary balance (p) 
Order of integration for 
public debt (b) 
BG I(0)  I(2) 
CZ I(0)  I(0) 
EE   I(0)  I(1) 
HU   I(0)  I(1) 
LV   I(0)   I(0)* 
   I(1)**
 
LT    I(0)* 
I(1)**
  I(0) 
PL    I(0)* 
    I(1)**
  I(1) 
RO I(0)  I(1) 
SK I(0)   I(0)* 
   I(1)**
 
SI I(1)  I(1) 
Notes:  * for 5%, and 10% 
** For 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Equation (7) is adjusted considering the particularities given by the ADF test, 
and different variants are applied for each case. For instance, when the variables are 
stationary, the primary balance or public debt-to-GDP ratios are used in the FRF (this 
is the case of BG, CZ, EE, HU, LV, RO, and SK for the dependent variable, p, and 
the case of CZ and LT for the explanatory variable, b). When the variables are in-
tegrated of order 1 the first difference of the primary balance, Δp, and public debt, 
Δb, as ratios to GDP are considered (this is the case of LT, PL and SI for the de-
pendent variable, p, and the case of EE, HU, LV, PL, RO, SK, and SI for the ex-
planatory variable, b). In Bulgaria’s case, the second difference of public debt, Δ
2b, is 
used to estimate the fiscal reaction function.  
Moreover, for BG, HU, LT, PL, RO, and SK, the set of explanatory variables, Z, 
includes lagged values of p or Δp. The reason for including them is related to 
the  statistical significance of the  estimated regression. In these cases, public debt 
becomes statistically significant only by adding lagged values of the primary balance. 
The number of lags for public debt is chosen considering the time when 
the  first reaction of the  government occurs and the  statistical tests show that β is 
significant different form zero. 
3.3 Empirical Results  
We now study the appropriate FRF country by country. The estimated results 
are presented in Table 3 (see also Table 2A in the Appendix). The results of our analy-
sis are consistent with the ones obtained by Aristovnik and Bostjan (2007), Afonso 
and Rault (2008), and Aristovnik (2008), who found that emerging economies from 
the European Union had issues with fiscal sustainability.  
In the case of Bulgaria, considering the different orders of integration of 
the two variables implied by equation (7), the primary balance (the dependent vari-
able), pt, is regressed on the second difference of public debt, Δ
2bt. The fiscal reaction 
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Table 3  Estimation Results for CEECs 
Country  Dependent variable Estimation results 
BG  p 
p(-4)         Δ
2b(-2)      c 
0.35          -0.15          2.08                           
[2.38]      [-2.30]         [3.76] 
Rsq: 0.13   F-stat:2.12 (0.13)
 
CZ  p 
b(-4)         c 
0.32         -11.42                                           
[2.31]      [-2.95] 
Rsq: 0.19   F-stat:7.21 (0.01)
 
EE  p 
Δb(-3)      c 
1.29          1.29                                             
[2.17]      [2.44] 
Rsq: 0.05   F-stat:1.62 (0.21)
 
HU   p 
p(-3)   Δb      c 
0.34    -0.63   -1.15                                       
[2.32]  [-1.38]  [-1.70] 
Rsq: 0.25   F-stat:4.85 (0.01) 
LV  p 
Δb       c 
-0.95   -0.42                                                  
[-3.91]  [-1.63] 
Rsq: 0.32   F-stat:15.42 (0.00) 
LT  Δp 
Δp(-2)   b(-3)     c 
-0.48     0.15      -3.11                                   
[-3.97]  [2.63]    [-2.54] 
Rsq: 0.28   F-stat:5.83 (0.00) 
PL  Δp 
Δp(-2)       Δb(-3)      c 
-0.47         -0.30        -0.10                            
[-5.47]     [-2.73]      [-0.45] 
Rsq: 0.28   F-stat:5.85 (0.00) 
RO  p 
p(-4)         Δb            c 
0.13         -1.66        -1.10                             
[0.55]     [-2.59]      [-1.83] 
Rsq: 0.31   F-stat:6.34 (0.00) 
SI  Δp 
Δb(-1)          c 
-0.51            -0.03          
[-4.07]        [-0.22]      
Rsq: 0.29   F-stat:13.11 (0.00) 
SK  p 
p(-1)         Δb            c 
0.54         0.19         -0.50                             
[4.27]     [1.03]      [-1.94] 
Rsq: 0.40   F-stat:10.76 (0.00) 
Notes: Probability in ( ) and t-statistic in [ ]. T-statistic was computed using standard errors adjusted with  
Newy-West HAC. 
 
function has a particular form given by the second difference of public debt, showing 
that the primary balance reacts when the dynamics of public debt are accelerating. 
The response is delayed by two lags (two quarters). The sign of the reaction is nega-
tive, but, considering the second difference as an approximation of convexity, and 
given the decreasing level of public debt ratios to GDP, the response of fiscal policy 
is as expected.
7 Governments try to lower debt by running high primary surpluses. 
7 The scenario about convexity and a decreasing level of public debt is very plausible, considering that 
the government aims to lower the public debt stock in the long run.  
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When public debt is decreasing, the primary surplus is lowered, given that it is no 
longer needed. Hence, the response of fiscal policy in Bulgaria’s case is as expected, 
taking into account the particular form of the fiscal reaction function. Moreover, over 
the period 2000–2008, Bulgaria ran a primary surplus on average and the real interest 
rate was below the real growth rate. In this situation, the government is able to gen-
erate a primary surplus in order to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long run.  
In the case of the Czech Republic, the two variables are stationary and equa-
tion (7) is applied. The primary balance reacts properly to changes in public debt, in 
the sense that an increase in public debt of 1 p.p. translates to an increase in the pri-
mary surplus or a decrease in the primary deficit of about 0.32 p.p. The response of 
the government is delayed by at least four quarters (one year). The government’s 
response to changes in public debt first occurs in the fourth quarter. Hence, for 
the Czech Republic, the government has the ability, in the short term, to run primary 
surpluses or at least to lower the primary deficit when the stock of public debt in-
creases. Such a fiscal reaction can create the necessary conditions to achieve fiscal 
sustainability in the long run. 
Equation (7) is adjusted for the case of Estonia, and, taking into account 
the order of integration, the primary balance, pt, is regressed on the first difference of 
the public debt stock, Δbt. The results show that the primary balance reacts to the dy-
namics of the public debt stock and that the response is as expected. A positive 
change in public debt will generate a primary surplus or a decrease of the primary 
deficit. The reaction is delayed by three quarters. Moreover, an increase of the stock 
of public debt has a large impact on the primary balance, in the sense that the re-
sponse to a 1 p.p. change in the public debt is larger than 1 p.p. However, taking into 
account the low values of R-squared (0.05), the change in public debt explains only 
5% of the primary balance. In this situation, it can be argued that fiscal policy (i.e., 
the primary balance) reacts to other stimuli than the public debt, the former having 
a larger impact on the primary balance. The weak reaction of the primary balance to 
changes in public debt can most probably be explained by the extremely low and 
stable public debt during 2000–2008 (the minimum value of public debt was about 
3% of GDP, and the maximum was about 5% – see Table 1). Therefore, Estonia’s 
recent fiscal policy should be assessed as being sustainable in the long run, but only 
as long as the public debt remains at the average levels recorded over these recent 
years. Should the public debt increase, current fiscal policy could face difficulties 
responding to public debt shocks. 
For the case of Hungary, the primary balance is regressed on the first dif-
ference of public debt, taking into account the unit root tests presented in Table 2 and 
the  order of integration of the  variables involved in the  FRF. The  statistical tests 
performed show that the dynamics of public debt do not have any significant impact 
on the primary balance.  
In the case of Latvia, the primary balance is regressed on the first difference 
of public debt. Fiscal policy reacts to the current dynamics of public debt, but the re-
action is the opposite of what is expected. A positive change in public debt generates 
a decrease of the primary surplus or an increase of the primary deficit. In this situ-
ation, fiscal policy is on an unsustainable path in the long run, considering that 
the primary balance showed a deficit on average over 2000–2008, even though the in- 
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Table 4   Cointegration Test in Poland’s Case 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value  Prob. 
None 0.26  13.33  15.49  0.10 
At most 1  0.09    3.17    3.84  0.07 
Notes: The lag length is 1 and it is given by AIC. 
The test considers intercept and no trend. 
 
debtedness level was not too high and the interest rate was not higher than the real 
growth rate. 
For the case of Lithuania, the first difference of the primary balance is con-
sidered to be dependent on the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal policy, in terms of 
changes in the primary balance, reacts properly to changes in the public debt stock. 
The reaction is delayed, but the sense is as expected. In this situation, running 
the same set of fiscal policies as over the period 2000–2008 would not generate sus-
tainability issues in the long run. 
For the case of Poland, changes in the primary balance react to the dynamics of 
public debt with a delay of three quarters. The response is the opposite, in the sense  
that positive dynamics of public debt will determine a negative change of the primary 
balance. In this situation, they will generate a decrease of the primary surplus or an in-
crease of the primary deficit. Therefore, fiscal sustainability is a problem in the long 
run. In the case of Poland, an in-depth analysis can be undertaken, considering that 
the primary balance and public debt are both integrated of order one. In this situation, 
a cointegration test is applied to investigate if there is any equilibrium relationship 
among the variables involved in the FRF (see Table 4). 
The test rejects the existence of any cointegration relationship between the pri-
mary balance and public debt. The movements of both variables are not able to 
respond to the magnitude of the disequilibrium, and the system will not return to 
the long-run equilibrium. The cointegration test confirms the OLS estimation, which 
showed that the reaction of the government to changes in public debt is not appro-
priate as far as the sign of the response is concerned. Consequently, running the same 
set of fiscal policies would generate sustainability issues in the long run. 
In the case of Romania, the primary balance is regressed on the first differ-
ence of public debt, and the results show that fiscal policy reacts to the current dy-
namics of public debt. The reaction of the Romanian government is the opposite to 
what is expected, in the sense that an increase in public debt of 1 p.p. leads to a de-
crease in the primary surplus or an increase in the primary deficit of 1.66 p.p. Such 
a response of fiscal policy shows that the government is not able to run surpluses or 
to lower the primary deficit if the stock of public debt increases. Over the period 
2000–2008, Romania had a low primary deficit and public debt stock as ratios to GDP, 
and the real interest rate was below the real growth rate on average (see Table 1). 
This context can partially explain the government’s behavior given by the fiscal re-
action function. In some scenarios, a  positive public debt shock can hardly be 
absorbed when the  response of fiscal policy is the  opposite. In the  long run, 
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Table 5  Cointegration Test in Slovenia’s Case 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized 




Critical Value  Prob. 
None 0.31  13.66  15.49  0.09 
At most 1  0.04    1.56    3.84  0.21 
Notes: The lag length is 2 and it is given by AIC. 
The test considers intercept and no trend 
 
the  Romanian government could face real difficulties in achieving fiscal sustain-
ability and could be forced into taking severe fiscal adjustment measures.  
In Slovenia’s case, the dynamics of the primary balance react to the dynamics 
of public debt with a delay of one quarter. A positive change of Δb leads to a nega-
tive change of Δp, implying a decrease of the primary surplus or an increase of the pri-
mary deficit. Taking into consideration that both variables are integrated of order 
one, the cointegration test gives the results summarized in Table 5. 
Slovenia’s case is similar to Poland’s, in the sense that movements of the pri-
mary balance in response to changes of public debt in the short term will not lead to 
an equilibrium relationship between the two variables considered. In this situation, 
Slovenia’s recent fiscal policy would face sustainability issues in the long run. 
In Slovakia’s case, the statistical tests show that the dynamics of public debt 
do not have a significant impact on the primary balance.  
4. Conclusions 
The concept of fiscal sustainability has received much attention in the last few 
decades and for European Union member states is still a much debated and contro-
versial topic. Unsound fiscal policies of individual EU member states could have 
adverse effects and harm other member’s economies, as witnessed by the  current 
turmoil on financial markets amid the fiscal woes of Greece and several other EU 
countries. This paper sheds some light on whether the fiscal policies of Central and 
Eastern European countries are sustainable in the long run. Using the fiscal reaction 
function model and a database consisting of quarterly data between 2000 and 2008, 
the main findings are the following. 
The fiscal reaction function has different forms depending on the order of in-
tegration given by the unit root tests. Study of this function brings into light the par-
ticularities of fiscal policies among the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Governments respond with some delay in most of the countries. However, 
taking into account the use of quarterly data, the speed of adjustment is rather quick. 
Fiscal policy reacts as expected in the cases of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania, in the sense that governments try to increase the pri-
mary surplus, or at least to lower primary deficit, when public debt is increasing. 
The expected reaction of fiscal policy in these cases shows that governments have 
the ability to generate primary surpluses in the short run and to achieve fiscal sus-
tainability in the long run.  
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For Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia the fiscal policy reaction is the op-
posite and governments face difficulties when it comes to responding to public debt 
shocks in the short term. The tendency to lower surpluses when public debt increases 
will cause difficulties for governments if they confront higher public debt stocks in 
the future. These governments would have to take an abrupt and severe fiscal adjust-
ment measures to respond properly to such shocks and to achieve fiscal sustainability 
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Table 2A  Main Findings of the Study 
Country  Fiscal reaction 




BG  p = f(Δ
2b)  2 Yes  - 
CZ  p = f(b)  4 Yes  - 
EE  p = f(Δb)  3 Yes 
R-squared is 0.05 implying that 
changes of public debt explains only 
5% of primary balance. 
HU  Δp = f(Δb)  2 Yes  - 
LV  p = f(Δb)  0 No 
- 
LT  Δp = f(b)  3 Yes  - 
PL  Δp = f(Δb)  3 No 
There is no cointegration relationship 
between primary balance and public 
debt. 
RO  p = f(Δb)  0 No  - 
SI  Δp = f(Δb)  1 No 
There is no cointegration relationship 
between primary balance and public 
debt. 
SK  p = f(Δb)  0 - 
Statistical tests rejected estimations. 
Public debt does not have a significant 
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